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INTRODUCTION
Maritime history is a booming area of interest among Japanese 
historians, many of whom focus on sea areas in Southeast and Northeast 
Asia. As for the latter, existing studies limit themselves to economic 
(above all, commercial) relations between China, Korea, and Japan. Few 
historians have written the history of Okhotsk or the Japan Sea from a 
maritime perspective, involving the Russian Empire. This chapter is 
devoted to developing this approach.
To combine maritime history with imperiology, it is necessary to 
consider relations between the problems of regional economies and im-
perial governance. Imperial peripheries often suffered from a dilemma: 
the imperial government wanted the peripheries to develop quickly, but 
could not provide them with the necessary resources for this purpose 
because of their remoteness. As a result, peripheries, often authorized 
to make independent, operative decisions, had no alternative but to rely 
upon neighboring countries to obtain resources. However, this solution 
often provoked strategic or security concerns for the imperial govern-
ment. There are several examples of this dilemma in the Russian Far 
East at the turn of the twentieth century, that is, problems of Chinese 
immigrant labor, port-franco, and Japanese entrepreneurs’ control over 
regional fi sheries. The Priamur Governor-Generalship tackled these 
dilemmas. The central mass media of the Russian Empire often exag-
gerated economic rivalries between the border regions, portraying the 
rivalries in a primordial manner. Nevertheless, the borderlands of the 
Russian Far East largely maintained mutually benefi cial, economically 
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cooperative relations with neighboring countries, which innovated 
constantly and adapted to changing conditions.
The issue of the “Hokuyo” fi sheries (the Japanese fi sheries in the 
Northern Pacifi c near Russian/Soviet waters) and confl icts around them 
provides a typical example of this constant innovation and adaptation. 
Previous studies of this issue stressed the rivalries between the parties 
involved in both countries: fi shermen, regional authorities, entrepre-
neurs, fi shery companies, politicians, and even public opinion. Whilst 
not denying the relevance of these tensions, it is important to introduce 
another analytical model addressed to Russo-Japanese relations. 
In both Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia, the process of con-
solidation of the Priamur fi shery system has hardly been studied. 
Japanese historians’ indifference to this issue seems to be caused by 
the small scale of the fi shery production in those waters at that time. 
Japanese contemporaries remarked on Russia’s constant attempts to 
exclude Japanese fi sherpersons.1 In Russia, there have been several 
studies on this issue. A. T. Mandrik, in his “A History of Fishery in 
the Russian Far East” (1994), which is a general history from the eight-
eenth century to the 1920s,2 admits the nationalization of fi shery by 
the Priamur governor-generalship without question, never regarding 
it as one of the possible options in fi shery policy. A. I. Alekseev and 
V. N. Morozov, in their “The Exploitation of the Russian Far East” 
(1989)3 provide a general history of the region in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. This book includes a valuable comparison of fi sh-
ery techniques and fi nancing between Russia and Japan,4 but I do not 
agree with the authors’ opinion that the Japanese authorities worked 
1 Karafuto teichi gyogyo suisan kumiai [The Karafuto Association of Fixed-Net Fishing], 
ed., Karafuto to gyogyo [Karafuto and Fishing] (Toyohara, 1931); Narita Yosaku, Karafuto 
oyobi kita enkaishuu [Karafuto and the Northern Part of the Maritime Region] (1905); Roryo 
suisan kumiai [The Marine Products Association of the Russian Territories], Roryou gyogyo 
no enkaku to genjo [History and the Current Situation of Fisheries in the Russian Territories] 
(Tokyo, 1938). 
2 A. T. Mandrik, Istoriia rybnoi promyshlennost’ rossiiskogo Dal’nego Vostoka (Vladivostok, 
1994).
3 A. I. Alekseev and V. N. Morozov, Osvoenie russkogo Dal’nego Vostoka (Moscow, 1989).
4 Ibid., p. 102.
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out a coherent policy on Japanese fi shery in the Russian Far East.5 A 
collection, “A History of the Russian Far East” (1991),6 maintains that 
several entrepreneurs held a monopoly in the Russian Far East fi shery 
industry in the late nineteenth century and ignores structural changes 
in this industry at the time. As a whole, these studies tend to describe 
the governor-generalship’s fi shery management not as a continuing 
process of trial and error but as a stable strategy. 
Particular diplomatic negotiations were held in order to regu-
late the Russo-Japanese fi shery relations at that time. In these talks, 
diplomats from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented 
Japanese interests, including those of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, and their Russian counterpart was the Priamur governor-
general. This system allowed him to make rapid, operative decisions, 
bypassing St. Petersburg’s bureaucratic formalities and considering 
urgent local needs. This is why this chapter focuses on the governor-
generalship’s strategies.
From its establishment in 1884 to the outbreak of the Russo-Japa-
nese War in 1904, the Priamur governor-generalship aimed to restrict 
foreign (i.e., Japanese) fi shing and, at the same time, promote Russian 
fi shing, though excluding the fi shing of the indigenous population. 
At a fi rst glance, restrictions on Japanese fi shery would seem to have 
benefi ted Russian regional fi shing. In fact, however, Japanese fi sh-
ing in the Russian Far East waters during this period showed stable 
growth. In other words, the more the Russian authorities tightened 
their control, the more Japanese fi shing developed. There is no paradox 
here because the Russian authorities implemented these regulations 
in a limited manner and, in some cases, even bridled Russian fi shing. 
For example, according to a writer of that time, Japanese poachers 
increased because of strict limitation of Japanese fi shing. Reports by 
the governor-generals will help to understand the mutual reliance of 
Russian and Japanese fi sheries.
5 Ibid., p. 102.
6 A. I. Krushanov, ed., Istoriia Dal’nego Vostoka SSSR v epokhu feodalizma i kapitalizma:
XII v.—fevral’ 1917 g. (Moscow, 1991).
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DEBATES AT THE KHABAROVKA CONFERENCES
IN 1885-1886 AND THE CONSEQUENCES
In 1885 and 1886, almost immediately after the introduction of 
the Priamur governor-generalship, the fi rst governor-general Baron 
A. N. Korf convened conferences of governors and other local lead-
ers (offi cials, scholars and entrepreneurs)7 in Khabarovka (the future 
Khabarovsk) to work out policies for the rapid exploitation of the 
region.8 These conferences consisted of sessions, one of which focused 
on fi shing. Its participants regarded full-scale progress in the region’s 
fi sheries as possible in the near future. They almost unanimously argued 
that the export of fi shery products and their domestic consumption, 
which would make the region prosper, had been hindered by the lack 
of specialists, labor force, capital investment, and salt for the preserva-
tion of fi sh.9 To overcome this situation, they requested the Priamur 
governor-generalship to investigate rock salt near Nikolaevsk. In their 
view, sea salt imported from China and Japan was cheaper than rock 
salt shipped from European Russia, but sea salt was impure and too 
bitter for pickling.
There were two methods of taxing fi sheries and this was another 
agendum of the fi shery session: taxation as a rent for inshore fi shing 
grounds or tax imposition upon the weight of fi shery products. The 
former was easier to implement, but gave no incentive to develop un-
cultivated fi shery grounds. The participants in the session supported 
the latter, the existing way of taxation, on the grounds that it would 
help offi cials to grasp the situation of the fi sheries and would not block 
access to newcomers. Remarkably, these participants took a positive 
attitude towards foreign newcomers and approved the policy that 
Russians would be given priority over foreigners only for new fi shery 
grounds. This limited priority that the Russians enjoyed did not mean 
the exclusion of foreigners from their fi sheries at all.
7 S’’ezd gubernatorov i drugikh predstavitelei (Khabarovka, 1885), pp. 33-34.
8 S’’ezd gubernatorov…; I. Nadarov, Vtoroi s’’ezd gubernatorov i drugikh predstavitelei v gorode 
Khabarovke (Vladivostok, 1886).
9 S’’ezd gubernatorov…, pp. 26-27.
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The report on the next Conference of 1893 showed that the gov-
ernor-generalship tried to realize the proposals made by the 1885-1886 
conferences.10 Governor-general Korf’s report to the emperor, covering 
the years of 1886-189111 and his brochure12 confi rm that the governor-
general repeated the view of the conferences in 1885 and 1886. The 
report gave a brief overview of fi shing in Lake Baikal and of Japanese 
fi shing in South Sakhalin. In this report Korf remarked that the Priamur 
fi shery as a whole, even including Japanese fi shing for Japanese con-
sumption, was still on a small scale. Concerned about the possibility that 
lax monitoring would lead to excessive fi shing and resource depletion, 
he requested a rigorous surveillance system.13 For sustainable growth of 
fi shing, Korf proposed to build fi shing villages with immigrants from 
inner Russia, as well as to ship qualifi ed salt from there. He noted that 
the settlement of fi shing immigrants had actually started in that year 
(probably after 1891) in response to an advertisement by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs.14 The topographical work by Korf also maintained 
that the main problem was the lack of quality salt and labor.15
Korf’s penchant for a fundamental solution of the problem was 
caused by the underdevelopment of the region’s fi shery. Market-ori-
ented fi sheries (not for home consumption) in Priamur at that time 
were comprised of salmon fi shing in the entire region, kelp gathering 
in the Maritime and South Sakhalin, herring fi shing primarily in South 
Sakhalin, and sea cucumber collecting, but all these were small in scale. 
For example, according to relatively reliable sources, Japanese fi shing 
in South Sakhalin was on a scale of 51 fi shery grounds, 72 large fi shing 
nets, 41 fi shing boats, 1,423 fi sherpersons, and a total production of 500 
10 Trudy III Khabarovskogo s’’ezda (Khabarovka, 1893), “Vvedenie.”
11 Vsepodanneishii otchet Priamurskogo general-gubernatora s 1886 g. po 1891 g. Ministerstvo 
vnutrennikh del.
12 A. N. Korf, Kratkii ocherk Priamurskogo kraia po offi tsial’nym dannym (St. Petersburg, 
1892).
13 The damage which excessive fi shing in the Baikal riverine system had caused to its 
fi shery reserves had already been known among policy-makers.
14 Vsepodanneishii otchet … s 1886 g. po 1891 g., p. 33.
15 Korf, Kratkii ocherk, pp. 30-31.
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thousand salmon in 1991. This amount differed little from that in the 
early 1880s.16
DEBATES AT THE KHABAROVSK CONFERENCE
IN 1893 AND THE CONSEQUENCES
In the early 1890s, in the lower Amur near Nikolaevsk-in-Amur, 
Japanese fi shing entrepreneurs started salmon fi shing and addition-
ally purchased salmon fi shed by Russians or indigenous habitants.17 
The Japanese undertook the management of several fi sheries with the 
military governor’s offi cial permission. This operation extended to the 
whole Maritime region.18 At the same time, the new fi shery regulations 
in 1890 set marine preserves at many river mouths. 
The governor-general and the military governors attended the 
Khabarovsk Conference in 1893,19 the agendas of which were broader 
than those of the 1886 conference. The conference discussed how to 
regulate salmon fi shery in the lower Amur and other fi sheries in the 
Maritime region and South Sakhalin. Concerning the former, the par-
ticipants argued for the long-term lease of fi shery grounds instead of 
imposing obligations on fi shery entrepreneurs. The fi shery session of 
the conference agreed to give absolute priority to Russian entrepre-
neurs’ benefi t. Opposing the existing one-year lease system, most of 
the participants from the business circles requested the long-term (12 
years) lease of fi shery grounds, together with sites for salting.20 Moreo-
ver, several participants criticized the existing system of obligatory 
16 Karafuto minsei sho [The Karafuto Civil Administration], Karafuto nanbu suisan yosatsu 
chosa hokoku [The Report of the Preliminary Investigation of Fisheries around the South 
Sakhalin] (Toyohara, 1907), pp.72-73. 
17 Vsepodanneishii otchet Priamurskogo general-gubernatora generala ot infanterii Grodekova 
1898-1900 gg. (Khabarovsk, 1901), p. 82.
18 Obzor Primorskoi oblasti za 1891 god (Prilozhenie ko Vsepodanneishemu otchetu) 
(Vladivostok, 1892), p. 10.
19 Trudy III Khabarovskogo s’’ezda, p. 47.
20 Ibid., p. 45.
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procurement of fi sh by entrepreneurs from the Nivkhs for the sake of 
the latter’s welfare.21
Kelp gathering and sea cucumber fi shing in Sakhalin and the Mari-
time region were aimed at export and therefore occupied an important 
position in the Priamur fi shing industry. The debates on the kelp gather-
ing at the conference focused on the problems of labor supply and tax 
charge, with the assumption that Russia could compete with Japan in 
this area if a right set of policies were adopted. Russian fi shery entre-
preneurs were obliged to hire some convicts in Sakhalin, the core area 
of kelp gathering in Priamur at that time. This administrative obligation 
was extremely unpopular among entrepreneurs. Few of these convicts 
worked diligently and the procedures for their employment were com-
plicated.22 In contrast, the Japanese brought their experienced Japanese 
fi sherpersons to Sakhalin at relatively low wages. Russian entrepreneurs 
worried about their uncompetitive position. At that time, the tax charge 
for the export of one pud (about 16.39 kg) of salted salmon was seven 
kopeks for foreigners and fi ve kopeks for Russians. The entrepreneurs 
insisted on an increase of ten kopeks in these charges for foreigners on the 
grounds that the Japanese were immune from taxation by the Japanese 
customs.23 Offi cials, but not entrepreneurs, initiated the debates on sea 
cucumber fi shing. They found it necessary to improve the custom system 
of fi shery export and to ban the use of diving gear.24 The 1893 conference 
showed that the local entrepreneurs began to be seriously concerned 
about their Japanese rivals and requested the governor-generalship to 
take measures to raise their competitiveness.
Despite the business circles’ protectionist demand, in his report 
to the emperor covering 1893-95,25 Governor-general S. M. Dukhovskoi 
proposed to attract Japanese fi shing to North Sakhalin to exploit new 
21 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
22 “Zapiska Kuptsa Ia.L. Semenova o morskoi kapuste (Prilozhenie XVIII),” Trudy III 
Khabarovskogo s’’ezda, pp. 123-125.
23 Trudy III Khabarovskogo s’’ezda, pp. 45-46. The Japanese certainly enjoyed immunity from 
taxation on the shipment of sea products from Sakhalin up to 1898.
24 Trudy III Khabarovskogo s’’ezda, p. 46.
25 Vsepodanneishii otchet Priamurskogo general-gubernatora 1893, 1894, 1895 gg. The preceding 
reports by governor-generals had only shown statistics of the general tax amount, while 
this report provided the statistics of fi sh catches in round numbers.
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fi shery grounds and the abundant food supply for Aleksandrovsk’s 
convicts. This report designed the locations of the new fi shery grounds 
with sites for salting and benefi cial tax charges.26 Strangely enough, the 
fact that Dukhovskoi’s proposal was carried out27 has been ignored in 
Japanese historiography. Thus, the myth that the Russian authorities 
were always restrictive against Japanese fi shing was created. Moreover, 
the report by Dukhovskoi shows that the 1893 conference’s request to 
raise the tax charge for foreigners for exporting salted salmon per pud 
from seven to ten kopeks had not been realized. In the same report, 
Dukhovskoi remarked on the need for professional assistance to develop 
fi shing.28 This request resulted in the establishment of the Priamur Na-
tional Property Agency, in charge of forestry and fi shery administration, 
under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture and National Property.29 
Thus, we observe the discrepancies between the protectionist fi shery 
entrepreneurs and the governor-generalship in search of the general 
development of the whole Priamur fi shery, even encouraging the active 
involvement of Japanese fi shers. 
THE TURNING POINT IN FISHERY ADMINISTRATION
In the summer of 1898, more than 1,000 Japanese fi sherpersons 
took an active part in salmon fi shing operations near Nikolaevsk, where 
very few Japanese fi sherpersons had fi shed previously.30 The increase of 
Japanese fi sherpersons was a universal phenomenon across the Priamur 
26 Vsepodanneishii otchet… 1893, 1894, 1895 gg., p. 96.
27 According to Japanese sources, new fi shery grounds under offi cial management were in 
operation at the projected location, Tymrovo in North Sakhalin, in 1896 and the Japanese 
fi shery entrepreneurs fi shed and purchased fi sh there. See Noshomu sho suisan kyoku 
[The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the Department of Fisheries], ed., Roryo 
saharin to gyogyo chosa hokoku [The Report of Fisheries around the Russian Sakhalin Island] 
(Tokyo, 1900), pp. 84-85.
28 Vsepodanneishii otchet… 1893, 1894, 1895 gg., p. 98.
29 Priamurskoe upravlenie gosudarstvennykh imushchestv, Uchrezhdenie upravleniia gos-
udarstvennymi imushchestvami v Priamurskom krae (Khabarovsk, 1897), p. 14.
30 Noshomu sho suisan kyoku, ed., Suisan boeki yoran zenpen [The Overview of Marine Products 
Trade] (Tokyo, 1903), p. 627.
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region. Increasingly more Japanese fi sherpersons rushed to Sakhalin 
after 1896. While there had been 84 areas, 113 large fi shing nets and 
2,158 fi sherpersons in 1895, by 1899 the number of fi shery grounds had 
increased to 227, and there were 244 nets and 4,346 fi sherpersons.31 
Though it is diffi cult to identify the reasons for this rapid development of 
Japanese fi shing, perhaps this was caused by the improvement in fi shing 
nets, expanding demand for sea products in Japan, the development of 
uncultivated grounds, and meteorological conditions.
In his report for 1896-1897,32 Dukhovskoi illustrated the decline in 
kelp gathering and sea cucumber fi shing because of the Sino-Japanese 
War and bad weather. At the same time, continues Dukhovskoi, the war 
did not affect the other areas of fi shery thanks to open ports in Japan. 
According to him, the Priamur fi shery had made steady progress, as was 
shown by the increase in tax revenues by 150 percent in three years, 1893-
95. Fishery entrepreneurs had emerged not only in the Maritime region 
but also in Kamchatka. An entrepreneur from Astrakhan attempted to 
salt fi sh with the latest technology in Sakhalin. In addition, the governor-
general presented a plan of the massive shipment of fi shery products by 
the Volunteer Fleet utilizing ice storage.33 
Changing his previous attitude towards foreign fishing, 
Dukhovskoi began to regard long-term lease of fi shery grounds as a 
forced evil, saying: “Although I understand some benefi ts of long-term 
lease,34 I have no other choice under these circumstances where there 
are not many fi shing populations for its vast fi shery grounds and where 
there are consequently few competitors among relatively few Russians 
and East Asian fi sherpersons.”35 Nevertheless, he also worried about the 
unconditional priority on Russians, considering the possibility to falsify 
fi shery ground leases by foreigners in the name of Russians. In fact, some 
Japanese had already begun this practice with the help of their Russian 
31 Karafuto minsei sho, Karafuto nanbu…, pp. 72-73. 
32 Vsepodanneishii otchet Priamurskogo general-gubernatora general-leitenanta Dukhavskogo 
1896-1897 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1898).
33 Vsepodanneishii otchet…1896-1897 gg., pp. 48-49.
34 As partly explained above, this manner of lease facilitated inshore transportation and 
promoted the exploitation of uncultivated fi shery grounds. This is why the Sakhalin au-
thorities often entrusted Japanese fi shing entrepreneurs with offi cial transportation.
35 Vsepodanneishii otchet…1896-1897 gg., pp. 48-49.
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collaborators in Sakhalin. Dukhovskoi concluded his report by express-
ing his hope for the emergence of willful competitive entrepreneurs, such 
as Denby and Semenov, who were the leading fi shing entrepreneurs in 
the Russian Far East and had been allowed to take a ten-year lease on 
several fi shery grounds in Sakhalin.36 However, this did not mean that 
the governor-general began to attempt to exclude foreigners from Far 
East fi shery. He worried about the Russian entrepreneurs’ technical and 
commercial weakness.
In November of 1899, the Priamur governor-generalship issued 
a new temporary regulation for regional sea fi sheries, composed of 59 
articles. Prior to this regulation, in July of that year, the governor-gen-
eralship had already promulgated a new tentative fi shery regulation 
applied only to the Lower Amur, which prohibited not only all foreign 
fi shing activities but also the employment of foreign labor engaged in all 
fi shing activities. These two regulations in 1899 tremendously infl uenced 
Japanese fi shery in the Priamur. The main purpose of the November 
regulation was to give Russians the unconditional priority over for-
eigners in the lease of fi shery grounds and the obligatory employment 
of Russian laborers. The Priamur National Property Agency actually 
stated that the regulation was designed to protect Russian entrepreneurs 
against foreign rivals.37
Understandably, this regulation faced a fi erce opposition from 
the Japanese fi shery entrepreneurs engaged in fi shing in the Priamur, 
especially in Sakhalin. The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered into 
negotiations with the Russian authorities. These negotiations resulted in 
a temporary compromise before the beginning of the fi shing season of 
1900 and the Priamur governor-generalship agreed to postpone the ap-
plication of several articles of the regulation in southern Sakhalin until the 
end of 1902.38 Nevertheless, the Priamur general-governorship enforced 
the regulation of July 1899 applying to the lower Amur. After this, the 
Japanese fi shery entrepreneurs in the lower Amur had no alternative 
but to buy fi sh from Russian and indigenous population.
36 Vsepodanneishii otchet…1896-1897 gg., pp. 51.
37 O rybnom promysle v Primorskoi oblasti na ostrove Sakhaline (Zapiska Priamurskogo upravleniia 
gosudarstvennykh imushchestv) (1903), p. 25.
38 Kaminaga Eisuke, “Saharin to suisangyo (1875-1904) wo meguru funso [Confl icts over Fisher-
ies around Sakhalin (1875-1904)],” Suravu Kenkyu/Slavic Studies 20 (2003), pp. 294-296. 
269
MARITIME HISTORY AND IMPERIOLOGY
In November 1901, the Priamur general-governorship issued a 
new temporary regulation regarding the entire regional fi shery, which 
aimed to prohibit foreigners from all kinds of fi shery operations in the 
region except southern Sakhalin for the time being. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan objected to this regulation, leading the Priamur 
governor-generalship to compromise and postpone its enforcement for 
a few years.
Why did the Priamur governor-generalship change their fi shery 
policy within only a few years? G. A. Kramarenko, a Sakhalin fi shery 
entrepreneur who originated from Astrakhan, wrote in his book of 1898 
that it was too diffi cult for the Russian entrepreneurs to compete with 
foreigners without preferential treatment by the authorities in Sakhalin.39 
At the same time, the military governor of the Maritime Region said in 
his report of 1898 that the over-exploitation by the Japanese along the 
Tatar Strait and the lower Amur had resulted in the latest thin years, 
which had driven the people of Nivkh into diffi culties.40 In his report 
to the Tsar for 1898-1900, Governor-general N. I. Grodekov wrote, 
“Salmon fi shing for export to Japan was the only substantial industry 
in Nikolaevsk-in-Amur, relatively populated in this region,”41 but “the 
Japanese exclusively operated the fi shery and the Russians only bought 
and processed fi sh till the season of 1898 after the Japanese had fi rst un-
dertaken it in 1893.”42 Moreover, “the Japanese entrepreneurs had hardly 
been funded by the Russians and had brought their labor from Japan.”43 
Grodekov appreciated the effect of the regulation for the lower Amur, 
promulgated in July 1899: “New entrepreneurs have already emerged 
in Nikolaevsk, where fi shery production has improved in quality and in 
quantity. In addition, they have smoothly supplied the local population 
with fi sh now. Things are going so well.”44
39 G. A. Kramarenko, Rybnye promysly na reke Amure i ostrove Sakhaline (Astrakhan, 1898), 
p. 6.
40 Obzor Primorskoi oblasti za 1898 god (Prilozhenie ko Vsepodanneishemu otchetu) (Vladivostok, 
1900), p. 12.
41 Vsepodanneishii otchet… 1898-1900 gg., p. 81.
42 Ibid., p. 82.
43 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
44 Ibid., p. 83.
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NEGATIVE EFFECTS IN SAKHALIN AND KAMCHATKA
Despite Grodekov’s view, restrictions on foreign (i.e., Japanese) 
fi shing turned out to be harmful to the regional Russian fi shing in 
Sakhalin and Kamchatka. As mentioned earlier, the governor-general 
announced a moratorium on enforcement of this regulation in Sakha-
lin before the fi shing season of 1900 as a response to the request of the 
Japanese government, but he opposed any further compromise.45 After 
1901, responding to the Japanese fi shery entrepreneurs’ request, the 
Japanese government hastily drafted a tariff barrier against Russian 
fi shery products and an almost prohibition of employment by Russians 
of Japanese labor. If these measures were carried out, they would have 
devastated the Russian fi shery. 
The governor-general and the Japanese Government reached a 
season-long compromise at the beginning of the 1901 season. They 
agreed to freeze each new action and the governor-general promised one 
season’s moratorium on the enforcement of this regulation in Sakhalin. 
Both sides repeated this action before 1902 and 1903. This compromise 
was inevitable since fi shing in Sakhalin relied much more on Japanese 
labor and market than fi shing in the lower Amur did. The Sakhalin 
colonization of those days inevitably relied upon fi shing, while the 
initial project of agrarian colonization of Sakhalin based on convicts’ 
labor proved to be impossible due to the meteorological conditions. As 
the Sakhalin military governor reported in regard to 1899-1901, some 
convicts and settlers earned their living through fi shing and sale of fi sh 
to the Japanese. The governor proposed to create more employment by 
developing fi shing.46 
At the turn of the century, fi shing in Kamchatka saw rapid de-
velopment for only a few years and this fi shing progress also included 
Japanese salmon poaching and American cod poaching. The Maritime 
military governor in charge of Kamchatka made a detailed analysis of 
these circumstances in his report for 1900 and 1902. He stated:
45 Ibid., pp. 87-90.
46 Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1899 g. (Prilozhenie k vsepodanneishemu otchetu) (St. Petersburg, 
n/d), pp. 46-47; Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1900 i 1901 god (Prilozhenie k vsepodanneishemu 
otchetu) (Aleksandrovsk na ostrove Sakhaline, 1902), p. 87.
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“With the number of Japanese engaging in our regional fi shing growing 
every year, the conditions surrounding the fi shery have represented a 
substantial change. The current fi shing regulation to all the Priamur is 
designed to promote Russian subjects’ fi shing. It is nevertheless diffi cult 
to apply the regulation in Kamchatka in my view, for it is impossible to 
recruit a mass of Russian fi sherpersons instead of Japanese ones, consid-
ering past results. Accordingly, strengthening our surveillance on their 
fi sheries, we should make an attempt to keep them under control and to 
collect expected taxes from them, while we should promote the further 
colonization of Russian subjects.”47
Hereupon, the Maritime military governor rather abandoned the 
objective of promoting Russian subjects’ fi shing. Rapidly varying condi-
tions surrounding regional fi shing did not allow the Russian authorities 
to apply a uniform regulation over the whole Priamur.
After the late 1880s, both participants of the Khabarovsk Confer-
ences and the governor-generals talked about fi sheries in the Priamur 
as a whole. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, with the number of 
Japanese engaging in the Priamur fi shery growing every year from the 
1890s, conditions surrounding fi shing had already varied regionally by 
the turn of the century. As a result, the regulation of November 1899 
as a uniform principle was diffi cult to apply to Sakhalin or Kamchatka, 
although the principle was that Russian subjects should enjoy favored 
treatment over foreigners.
CONCLUSION
The report of the Priamur National Property Agency issued in 
1903 revealed that the basic administrative directions for the Priamur 
fi shery was the “nationalization” (more properly, it means “Russiani-
zation”) of the industry, that is to say, the encouragement of Russian 
entrepreneurs’ fi sheries and the employment of Russian labor. The 
report additionally concluded that foreign entrepreneurs had already 




completed their role of accelerating Russian fi shing since the regional 
Russian fi shing has taken fi rm root, to a certain extent.48
The report of the fourth Khabarovsk Conference held in the same 
year also stated that their immediate agenda was “nationalization.” 
There was another argument that the region still needed foreign labor to 
encourage Russian fi shing. However, pointing out that Russian fi shing 
in the lower Amur had achieved a successful outcome in “nationaliza-
tion” set this opinion aside.49
To be sure, the “nationalization” policy was one of the prearranged 
administrative plans after the late 1880s, but it was not of high priority 
over the comprehensive, steady development of fi sheries or tax revenue 
enhancement until the late 1890s. There was an important turning point 
in the fi shing policy of the Priamur Governor-Generalship at the turn 
of the century. As I have previously stated, the military governors of 
Sakhalin and Maritime were already at that point concerned about the 
possibility that their new regulation would have a worsening effect 
on Russian fi shing. In fact, after enforcing the regulation of July 1899 
in the lower Amur, there were more and more Japanese poachers in 
Kamchatka.
Thus, the Russian authorities were never consistent in their “na-
tionalization” policy, especially in regard to the exclusion of Japanese 
entrepreneurs and labor. Moreover, the policy that had gone into effect 
did not necessarily play its expected role. I neither mean that there was 
no stable direction in fi shery policies pursued by the Russian authorities, 
nor that Japan enjoyed unchallenged supremacy in Priamur fi shing. I 
only suggest that the Russian authorities devised their administrative 
measures in fi shing through a trial-and-error process, rather than through 
a set of previously arranged principles. 
This chapter combines maritime and imperiological approaches to 
analyze the fi shing regulations implemented by the Priamur governor-
generalship. Viewing imperial frontiers from the seas surrounding them 
gives a clearer understanding of the mutual interactions and interde-
pendence of adjacent imperial frontiers. This leads to recognition of the 
48 O rybnom promysle, p. 36.
49 Trudy IV Khabarovskogo s”ezda, sozvannogo Priamurskim general-gubernatorom D. I. Subot-
ichem 1903 g. (Khabarovsk, 1904), pp. 7-8.
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mega-systems of empires, which Alexei Miller proposes in Chapter 1 
of this collection.
The Priamur governor-generalship devised fi shery policies only by 
trial and error. There were compelling reasons that prevented it from 
ready-made policies. As explained in this chapter, one fundamental 
reason for this was the dilemma of imperial borderlands experiencing 
an urgent need for resource mobilization and fearing dependence on 
neighboring countries. The Priamur governor-generalship was forced 
to tackle this dilemma under several disadvantageous conditions, such 
as the vast uncultivated coastlines, the small Russian population, and 
the large demand for sea products in Japan. On the eve of the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-05, the governor-generalship abandoned pursuit 
of the “nationalization” policy, and consoled itself with partial sanctions 
against Japanese entrepreneurs, coordinating moreover these actions 
with Japanese ministries. The Priamur governor-generalship’s decision 
to maintain the status quo did not imply its immobility. In some cases, 
this attitude was motivated by its preference for cooperation with Japan, 
in other cases by its risk-evading behavior. In this context as well, the 
Priamur governor-generalship’s fi shery policy was characterized by 
eternal trial and error.
